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PREFACE 
This paper provides a descriptive account of significant 
events in the accident at the Three Mile Island nuclear power 
plant in March, 1979. It is based upon documents collected as 
background materials for the IIASA workshop: Procedural and 
3rganizational Yeasures for Accident Management: Nuclear 
Reactors. In additon to the references listed, information was 
supplied by John Lathrop, who conducted interviews with 
qovernment and industry officials involved in the crisis. 
There have been several reports from several sources 
describinq the accident at Three Mile Island. This report 
distinguishes itself by presenting a summary of those aspects 
of the accident especially relevant to the development of 
improvements in procedural and orqanizational measures for 
accident preparedness and nanaqement. 
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T . INTRODUCTION 
Nuclear power plant safety has become the focus of 
increasing public concern in virtually every nation involved in 
a nuclear program. While the safety of the entire nuclear fuel 
cycle is being questioned, a major controversy in recent months 
has arisen over the risks associated with operating nuclear 
power plants near major population centers. The recent 
accident at Three Mile Island has intensified the debate over 
both the probability and the consequences of a major accident 
at a nuclear facility. 
Using Three Mile Island (TMI) as a case study, this paper 
begins with a short chronological description of the accident, 
followed by a discussion of the several categories of failures 
which compounded to exacerbate the accident's severity. 
4ttention is then given to the various actors and the 
circumstances under which they made decisions to mitigate the 
crisis. Although the next accident involving a nuclear reactor 
will probably not occur in the same manner as TMI, the 
specifics of the TMI experience may be used to identify issues 
which may surface again in future efforts to manage accidents 
involving nuclear reactors. 
11. THE ACCIDENT AT THREE MILE ISLAND UNIT I1 
A. Chronological Summary 
The information in this section is compiled from the 
report of the investigation into TMI by the Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission Office of Inspection and Enforcement [13], and the 
analysis of TMI by the Nuclear Safety Analysis Center 1181. 
At approximately 4 a.m. on March 28, 1979, the second unit 
of the Three Mile Island nuclear power plant (TMI 11) 
experienced a malfunction in its secondary (non-nuclear) 
cooling system which triggered a series of events leadinq to 
significant damage to the reactor core. In the first 13 
seconds, the sequence of events was generally normal for an 
anticipated feedwater transient and the plant response was as 
expected. However, subsequent events--combinations of operator 
errors, design errors and mechanical failures--contributed 
in varying degrees .to heightening the accident's severity. 
The loss of secondary coolant began with a malfunction 
which caused the condensate pump to shut off. This resulted in 
the automatic tripping of both secondary feed pumps which in 
turn led to a turbine trip on high pressure. Shortly after the 
turbine trip, the auxiliary feedwater system began operation 
but was unable to provide secondary coolant because the flow 
paths were blocked by closed valves. As the rate of heat 
removal declined in the secondary loop, the pressure in the 
primary loop rose to 2255 psi and the pilot operated relief 
valve (PORV) opened to vent excess pressure (t=4 sec.). When 
the pressure in the primary loop reached 2355 psi (t=9 sec.), 
the reactor tripped (scrammed), thereby terminating the nuclear 
reaction and reducing the heat generated to decay heat alone. 
Approximately 9 seconds after the PORV began venting 
pressure in the primary loop, the reactor pressure was reduced 
to 2205 psi. At this point the valve should have closed but 
failed to do so (t=13 sec.). This was the first abnormal 
occurrence in the plant's response to the accident sequence. 
For the next two hours the reactor coolant vented through the 
stuck valve into the drain tank. Meanwhile, in response to what 
was believed to be normal transient behavior, the operators 
began injecting water into the primary loop. 
As reactor pressure decreased to a pre-set level (1640 
psi), the plant's high pressure injection (HPI) emergency core 
cooling system (ECCS) was automatically initiated and beqan to 
inject cold water into the reactor (t=2 min.). Within a few 
seconds the drain tank pressure increased to the point where a 
small amount of coolant was released through a relief valve and 
beqan to collect in the reactor building sump (t=3 min. 14 
sec.). This continued until the accumulation of reactor 
coolant in the drain tank caused the rupture disk to blow (t=14 
min. 50 sec.), thereby allowing approximately 32,000 gallons of 
radioactive water to spill from the drain tank in the first 
160 minutes of the accident. 
With the rapid and continuing depressurization of the 
system, steam voids formed, causing the pressurizer water level 
to cease to directly reflect the actual reactor coolant 
inventory. Yet the operators did not realize that voids were 
forming, and concentrated on keeping the pressurizer water 
level within the bounds stressed in their training. As a 
result,when the pressurizer water level reached 90 per cent 
(t=4 min. 40 sec.) , with reactor pressure at 1400 psi, the 
operators turned off one of the ECCS pumps and throttled down 
the second pump. 
As the water from the reactor coolant drain tank 
accumulated in the reactor building sump, the pressure in the 
containment building rose approximately 2 psi. However, the 
isolation of the containment building, which would have 
occurred automatically with an increase of 4 psi, had not yet 
been initiated. Therefore, when the reactor building sump 
pumps were automatically activated in response to the rising 
water level, they discharged the radioactive water into tanks 
in the auxiliary building (t=7 min. 30 sec.). These tanks soon 
filled and overflowed onto the floor of the building. 
For the remainder of the first hour the operators worked 
to stabilize the reactor but were handicapped because the 
pressurizer level readings did not directly reflect the reactor 
coolant inventory. Primary coolant continued to vent through 
the stuck relief valve and steam voids in the primary system 
prevented the normal flow of coolant. With the system 
parameters in saturated conditions, the indicated flow 
decreased and the operators noticed vibration in the reactor 
coolant pumps. Because the vibration was believed to be an 
indication of pump cavitation, they shut off two of the four 
primary reactor coolant pumps to avoid damaging them (t=l hr. 
13 min.). The remaining two pumps were soon turned off for 
similar reasons (t=l hr. 41 min.). 
The operators were attempting to cool the core with 
natural circulation but steam voids prevented them from 
achieving the desired circulation. As a result, the 
temperature in the prinary loop hot leg increased rapidly and 
within fifteen minutes went off the scale at approximately 620 
degrees F, while the temperature in the cold leg continued to 
decrease. The large temperature differential continued for 
approximately the next 8 hours. During this time the severe 
damage to the reactor core is believed to have occurred. 
Inadequate cooling caused the fuel temperature to increase to 
the point where the zircalloy fuel cladding reacted with the 
hot steam to produce hydrogen gas. This gas was released into 
the primary cooling system and was ultimately vented through 
the failed PORV into the containment building. When the 
operator discovered the stuck relief valve and isolated it by 
closing a block valve in series with it (t=2 hrs. 18 min.), the 
r e l e a s e  o f  s t eam and w a t e r  c e a s e d  and t h e  p r i m a r y  s y s t e m  was 
s e a l e d  f o r  t h e  f i r s t  t i m e  i n  o v e r  two h o u r s .  The s y s t e m  
p r e s s u r e  t h e n  i n c r e a s e d  and was r e g u l a t e d  by i n t e r m i t t e n t l y  
open ing  and c l o s i n g  t h e  b l o c k  v a l v e .  
A s h o r t  t i m e  l a t e r  t h e  r e a c t o r  c o n t a i n m e n t  b u i l d i n g  
r a d i a t i o n  m o n i t o r s  i n d i c a t e d  t h a t  t h e r e  was a  p o t e n t i a l  f o r  
o f f - s i t e  r e l e a s e s  of  r a d i a t i o n  ( t = 2  h r s .  4 5  min . ) .  T h e r e f o r e ,  
a  s i t e  emergency was d e c l a r e d  ( t = 2  h r s .  50 min . ) .  For  t h e  n e x t  
t h i r t e e n  h o u r s  t h e  o p e r a t o r s  a t t e m p t e d  t o  r e s t o r e  p r i m a r y  
c o o l i n g  b u t  were u n a b l e  t o  do  s o  b e c a u s e  o f  hydrogen  g a s  and 
s t e a m  v o i d s  p r e s e n t  i n  t h e  sys tem.  A t  a p p r o x i m a t e l y  10 h r s ,  a  
28 p s i  p r e s s u r e  s p i k e  was r e g i s t e r e d .  T h i s  is  b e l i e v e d  t o  have  
r e s u l t e d  from a n  e x p l o s i o n  o f  hydrogen  i n  t h e  c o n t a i n m e n t  
b u i l d i n g .  
A t  a b o u t  8  p.m., 16 h o u r s  a f t e r  t h e  i n i t i a t i o n  o f  t h e  
a c c i d e n t ,  t h e  o p e r a t o r s  s u c c e s s f u l l y  r e s t a r t e d  one  o f  t h e  
p r i m a r y  r e a c t o r  c o o l i n g  pumps. The c o r e  i n l e t  and e x i t  c o o l a n t  
t e m p e r a t u r e s  t h e n  began t o  i n d i c a t e  a  c o o l i n g  t r e n d .  The 
r e a c t o r  p r e s s u r e  s t a b i l i z e d  and h e a t  was t r a n s f e r r e d  t h r o u g h  
one  s t eam g e n e r a t o r  t o  t h e  main c o n d e n s e r .  Forced  c i r c u l a t i o n  
o f  t h e  p r i m a r y  c o o l a n t  was m a i n t a i n e d  u n t i l  A p r i l  2 7 , 1 9 7 9 , w h e n  
t h e  p r i m a r y  r e a c t o r  c o o l a n t  pump was s h u t  down and t h e  p l a n t  
was p l a c e d  i n  a  n a t u r a l  c i r c u l a t i o n  mode w i t h  h e a t  removal  
t a k i n g  p l a c e  t h r o u g h  t h e  t h e  s t eam g e n e r a t o r .  
8. Major F a c t o r s  Compounding A c c i d e n t  S e v e r i t y  
Human E r r o r  
P e r h a p s  t h e  most  o b v i o u s  example o f  human e r r o r  was t h e  
f a i l u r e  t o  open t h e  v a l v e s  on  t h e  a u x i l i a r y  f e e d w a t e r  sys t em.  
The v a l v e s  were c l o s e d  d u r i n g  a  r e q u i r e d  p l a n t  s a f e t y  s y s t e m  
s u r v e i l l a n c e  p r o c e d u r e  two d a y s  b e f o r e  t h e  a c c i d e n t  and e i t h e r  
were  n o t  r e o p e n e d ,  d e s p i t e  a  c h e c k l i s t  p r o v i s i o n  f o r  s u c h  a n  
a c t i o n ,  o r  were i n a d v e r t e n t l y  c l o s e d  l a t e r .  I f  t h e  v a l v e s  were 
l e f t  c l o s e d  a f t e r  t h e  s u r v e i l l a n c e  p r o c e d u r e ,  t h e  s i t u a t i o n  
c o u l d  h a v e  gone u n n o t i c e d  f o r  d a y s  b e c a u s e  e a c h  s h i f t  change  
r e q u i r e d  a  s t a t u s  r w i e w  b u t  n o t  a c h e c k l i s t  o f  key s y s t e m s .  
F u r t h e r m o r e ,  t h e  s i t u a t i o n  was n o t  r e a d i l y  a p p a r e n t  t o  
o p e r a t o r s  i n  t h e  c o n t r o l  room b e c a u s e  t h e  l i g h t s  on t h e  c o n t r o l  
board  were co lo r -keyed  w i t h  " r e d v v  i n d i c a t i n g  t h a t  a  v a l v e  was 
i n  t h e  "open" p o s i t i o n  and " g r e e n "  i n d i c a t i n g  t h a t  a  v a l v e  was 
i n  t h e  " c l o s e d "  p o s i t i o n .  One o f  t h e  i n d i c a t o r s  may h a v e  a l s o  
oeen  o b s c u r e d  by m a i n t e n a n c e  t a g s  h a n g i n g  down from a n o t h e r  
sys t em.  Whi le  t h i s  example o f  human e r r o r  is  q u i t e  d i s t u r b i n g  
b e c a u s e  o f  i t s  i m p l i c a t i o n s  f o r  human pe r fo rmance  c o n c e r n i n g  
r e a c t o r  s a f e t y ,  i t  d i d  n o t  i n  f a c t  s u b s t a n t i a l l y  e x a c e r b a t e  t h e  
a c c i d e n t .  
Another  e r r o r  was t h e  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  o f  h i g h  r e a d i n g s  from 
t h e  p r e s s u r i z e r  i n d i c a t o r  t o  mean t h a t  t h e r e  was a n  a d e q u a t e  
i n v e n t o r y  o f  r e a c t o r  c o o l a n t .  O p e r a t o r  t r a i n i n g  and e x p e r i e n c e  
had e m p h a s i z e d  t h e  n e c e s s i t y  o f  m a i n t a i n i n g  a  s t e a m  v a p o r  s p a c e  
i n  t h e  p r e s s u r i z e r .  However,  t h e  o p e r a t o r s  a p p a r e n t l y  d i d  n o t  
r e a l i z e  t h a t  t h e  c o n t i n u e d  d e p r e s s u r i z a t i o n  c o u l d  l e a d  t o  t h e  
f o r m a t i o n  o f  s t e a m  v o i d s  i n  r e g i o n s  o f  t h e  s y s t e m  o t h e r  t h a n  
t h e  p r e s s u r i z e r  and t h a t  u n d e r  t h e s e  c o n d i t i o n s  t h e  p r e s s u r i z e r  
l e v e l  r e a d i n g  c o u l d  b e  m i s l e a d i n g .  Assuming t h e  l e v e l  
i n d i c a t i o n  t o  mean t h a t  t h e  c o r e  was  f l o o d e d ,  t h e  o p e r a t o r s  
t h r o t t l e d  t h e  HPI/ECCS s y s t e m .  
F i n a l l y ,  when t h e  o p e r a t o r s  t u r n e d  o f f  t h e  main  c o o l a n t  
pumps t o  a v o i d  damaging  them,  t h e y  i n i t i a t e d  a  s e r i e s  o f  e v e n t s  
which  g r e a t l y  i n c r e a s e d  t h e  s c o p e  o f  t h e  damage t o  t h e  r e s t  o f  
t h e  r e a c t o r .  The s e v e r e  u n d e r c o o l i n g  o f  t h e  r e a c t o r  c o r e  
c a u s e d  t h e  r e a c t i o n  b e t w e e n  t h e  f u e l  c l a d d i n g  and  t h e  p r i m a r y  
c o o l a n t .  The r e s u l t i n g  h y d r o g e n  g a s  r e l e a s e d  i n t o  t h e  p r i m a r y  
s y s t e m  hampered  e f f o r t s  t o  b r i n g  t h e  r e a c t o r  i n t o  a  c o l d  
s h u t d o w n  s t a t e .  
M e c h a n i c a l  F a i l u r e s  
A m e c h a n i c a l  f a i l u r e - - t h e  m a l f u n c t i o n  o f  t h e  c o n d e n s a t e  
f e e d w a t e r  pump i n  t h e  s e c o n d a r y  loop--was t h e  i n i t i a t i n g  e v e n t  
o f  t h e  T h r e e  Mile I s l a n d  a c c i d e n t .  B u t  b y  f a r  t h e  m o s t  s e r i o u s  
m e c h a n i c a l  f a i l u r e  was  t h e  p r e s s u r i z e r  r e l i e f  v a l v e  which  
f a i l e d  t o  c l o s e  o n c e  t h e  p r e s s u r e  i n  t h e  p r i m a r y  l o o p  had  b e e n  
s u f f i c i e n t l y  r e d u c e d .  The s t u c k  v a l v e  p r o v i d e d  a  p a t h  f o r  t h e  
r e a c t o r ' s  r a d i o a c t i v e  c o o l a n t  t o  e s c a p e .  T h i s  i n  t u r n  l e d  t o  
t h e  h i g h  p r e s s u r i z e r  l e v e l  o n  l o w  c o o l a n t  i n v e n t o r y ,  w h i c h  l e d  
t h e  o p e r a t o r s  t o  t h e  i n c o r r e c t  c o n c l u s i o n  t h a t  t h e  c o r e  was 
c o v e r e d  w i t h  c o o l a n t .  
D e s i g n  E r r o r s  
T h e r e  a r e  s e v e r a l  f e a t u r e s  p e c u l i a r  t o  B&W d e s i g n s  which  
a r e  p a r t i c u l a r l y  s e n s i t i v e  t o  t r a n s i e n t  c o n d i t i o n s  o r i g i n a t i n g  
i n  t h e  s e c o n d a r y  s y s t e m .  Some o f  t h e s e  f e a t u r e s  were 
i d e n t i f i e d  b y  H a r o l d  Den ton  i n  t e s t i m o n y  b e f o r e  t h e  House 
S u b c o m m i t t e e  on  E n e r g y  R e s e a r c h  a n d  P r o d u c t i o n  [ I ] ;  (1) d e s i g n  
o f  t h e  s t e a m  g e n e r a t o r s  t o  o ; e r a t e  w i t h  r e l a t i v e l y  s m a l l  l i q u i d  
v o l u m e s  i n  t h e  s e 2 o n d a r y  s i d e ,  ( 2 )  t h e  l a c k  o f  d i r e c t  
i n i t i a t i o n  o f  r e a c t o r  t r i p  upon t h e  o c c u r r e n c e  o f  o f f - n o r m a l  
c o n d i t i o n s  i n  t h e  f e e d w a t e r  s y s t e m ,  ( 3 )  r e l i a n c e  o n  a n  
i n t e g r a t e d  c o n t r o l  s y s t e m  ( I C S )  t o  a u t o m a t i c a l l y  r e g u l a t e  
f e e d w a t e r  f l o w ,  ( 4 )  a c t u a t i o n  b e f o r e  r e a c t o r  t r i p  o f  a  p i l o t  
o p e r a t e d  r e l i e f  v a l v e  on t h e  p r i m a r y  s y s t e m  p r e s s u r i z e r  ( w h i c h  
may a g g r a v a t e  t h e  e v e n t  i f  t h e  v a l v e  s t i c k s  o p e n ) ,  and  ( 5 )  a  
low s t e a m  g e n e r a t o r  e l e v a t i o n  ( r e l a t i v e  t o  t h e  r e a c t o r  v e s s e l )  
which  p r o v i d e s  1 s m a l l e r  d r i v i n g  h e a d  f o r  n a t u r a l  c i r c u l a t i o n .  
I n  a d d i t i o n ,  t h e  p r o p e r  f u n c t i o n i n g  o f  t h e  p r e s s u r i z e r  v a l v e  is  
e s s e n t i a l  t o  t h e  s a f e  o p e r a t i o n  o f  p r e s s u r i z e d  w a t e r  (PWR) 
p l a n t s  b e c a u s e  t h e  w a t e r  l e v e l  i n  t h e  c o r e  is t y p i c a l l y  n o t  
m e a s u r e d  d i r e c t l y  b u t  i s  i n f e r r e d  f rom t h e  w a t e r  l e v e l  i n  t h e  
p r e s s u r i z e r .  T h u s ,  a  v a l v e  s t u c k  i n  t h e  o p e n  p o s i t i o n  a l l o w s  
the pressurizer to fill with escaping coolant, thereby giving 
an erroneous indication of coolant level to the operator in the 
control room. 
Because of these specific features Denton concluded, "The 
B&W design relies more than other PWR designs on the 
reliability and performance characteristics of the auxiliary 
feedwater system, the integrated control system, and the 
emergency core cooling system (ECCS) performance to recover 
from certain anticipated transients, such as loss of off-site 
power and loss of normal feedwater. This in turn requires 
greater operator knowledge and skill to safely manage the plant 
controls during such anticipated transients [I]." 
In addition, automatic isolation of the containment 
building is designed to take place with pressure increases of 4 
psi. Yet the unexpected failure mode at TMI I1 produced a need 
for containment isolation with a pressure increase of only 2 
psi. Radioactive water discharged from the relief valve was 
pumped out of the unisolated containment building once the 
transfer pumps were automatically initiated by the rising water 
level. This unintentional release of radioactive water 
ultimately was one of the principal sources of off-site 
releases of radioactivity. 
111. PRINCIPAL ACTORS IN CRISIS MANAGEMENT 
4. Federal 
The federal agencies supporting the State of Pennsylvania 
during the Three Mile Island crisis were: Federal Disaster 
Assistance Agency, Defense Civil Preparedness Agency, Federal 
Preparedness Agency, Department of Defense (Army and Air 
Force), Health Education and Welfare, Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission (NRC), Federal Highway Administration, Department of 
Energy (DOE), Environmental Protection Agency, Department of 
Agriculture, Treasury, Internal Revenue Service, Veterans' 
Administration, Federal Aviation Administration, Housing and 
Urban Development, General Services Administration, Post 
Office. Additional support was offered by national 
organizations such as the Red Cross, the Salvation Army, the 
AFL/CIO, and the Council of Church Organizations. Approximately 
258 federal personnel were eventually on hand at the plant 
site. Of those present about 7 5  were from the NRC and 
approximately 10Q were from DOE. 
Although not directly in the line of authority, the 
Department of Energy played a major role in coordinating the 
activities of several of the other agencies. A major DOE 
activity was coordination of the various radiation monitoring 
efforts. DOE Radiological Assistance Teams (RAT) and Nuclear 
Emergency Survey Teams (NEST) assumed most of the 
responsibility for radiation monitoring once the NRC had 
determined that the State of Pennsylvania did not have 
sufficient equipment to properly monitor off-site radiation 
levels. Monitoring and support equipment was provided under 
the Interagency Radiological Assistance Plan (IRAP). 
At the time of the accident at TMI 11, the Federal 
Emerqency Management Agency (FEMA) was being organized. This 
agency will eventually combine the emergency response resources 
of the Fire Administration, the Insurance Administration, the 
Defense Civil Preparedness Aqency, the Federal Disaster 
Assistance Aqency (part of Housing and Urban Development), and 
the Federal Preparedness Agency. 
B. State 
Two major state agencies were involved at Three Mile 
Island. The Pennsylvania Emerqency Management Aqency (PEMA), at 
the time of the accident, was in the process of expanding its 
authority from "preparedness and response" to include "accident 
prevention, mitigation and recovery." The Bureau of Radiation 
Protection, part of the Department of Environmental Resources, 
had major responsibilities concerning planning for and 
responding to the crisis. 
Civil defense in Pennsylvania is administrated at the 
county level with the state operating in the role of a 
coordinator. Because of the frequent need to respond to all 
types of emergencies, PEMA has established an Emergency 
Operations Center (EOC). The Center serves as a coordinating 
point for representatives of the emergency response teams of 
various state agencies. Representatives reporting to the EOC 
have prior permission from their respective secretaries to 
commit department and agency resources as necessary. The 
organizations involved in the EOC are: the Governor's Emergency 
Council, the National Guard, the Department of Agriculture, the 
Pennsylvania State Police, the Pennsylvania Department of 
Transportation, the Department of Public Welfare, the 
Department of Health, the General Services Administration, the 
PublicUtilitiesCOmmi~~iOn, and the Department of Education. 
For policy guidance concerning state emergency management, 
there is a council consisting of the Governor, the Lieutenant 
Governor, the secretzries of various state agencies, and four 
state leg islators. 
The operator/licensee of the Three Yile Island plant is 
Metropolitan Edison Company, a subsidiary of General Public 
Utilities, Inc. In addition to the resources of the federal, 
state, and licensee groups involved, technical expertise and 
other assistance during the accident was provided by the 
manufacturer, Babcock & Wilcox, and by various organizations 
with an interest and expertise in nuclear energy, including the 
Atomic Tqdustrial Forum, the Electric Power Research Institute, 
and the Edison Electric Institute. Observers from other 
nations were also on hand throughout the crisis, although they 
provided no direct assistance. 
IV. PRINCIPLES ESTABLISHED BEFORE THREE MILE ISLAND 
A .  Control of Facilities 
Nuclear generating facilities are subject to some of the 
most stringent regulatory guidelines imposed on any industry. 
The exact extent to which violations of established operating 
regulations contributed to and exacerbated the TMI accident is 
still a matter of dispute and of an ongoing investigation by a 
number of government agencies and by various Congressional 
review groups. A preliminary report issued by the NRC Office 
of Inspection and Enforcement in August, 1979, has identified 
35 apparent violations of government regulations at the plant 
C131. Nineteen of these violations have been listed as 
"potential items of noncompliance" in operating the facility 
and 16 of the items deal with radiation hazards. The charges 
vary in severity from failure to properly log events to 
violations involving the closure of emergency feedwater valves. 
Six major areas in which inadequacies were listed were: 
equipment performance, accident analysis, operator training and 
performance, equipment ;nd system design, information flow, and 
implementation of emergency planning. 
B. Radiation Guidelines 
Radiation guidelines for nuclear facilities are defined in 
terms of protective kction Guidelines (PAGs) [141. PAGs were 
originally introduced to assist public health and other 
government authorities in establishing levels of radiation 
hazard which would constitute a basis for initiating emergency 
.?rotective actions or coilnt?rmeasures. PAGs are definable for 
all radiation pathways which ~ig" lead to human exposure and 
are expressed in units of radiation dose (REM) representing 
trigger or initiation levels which warrant predetermined 
actions to protect the public health. Plume exposure PAGs for 
the most important c o ~ n t ~ r m e ~ s u r e s  are 5 REM whole body and 25 
REM thyroid. For milk ingestion, the correspondng PAGs are 38 
REM thyroid to an individual and 10 REM thyroid for a suitable 
sample of the population--usually calculated on the basis of an 
infant's thyroid. While PAGs are to be used as tools for 
emergency response planning, they only represent countermeasure 
trigger levels--not acceptable dose levels. 
C. Emergency Response Plans 
As early as 1962 the federal government recognized the 
need to have contingency plans for dealing with emergencies 
arising from the operation of nuclear generating facilities. 
One of the earliest regulations in this area, 10 CFR (Code of 
Federal Regulations) Part 10'6 (1962) stated that a capability 
for taking protective actions to safeguard the general public 
in the event of a serious accident should be established for 
the Low Population Zone (LPZ), the region in the immediate 
vicinity of a nuclear power plant site. In 1970 the Atomic 
Energy Commission issued explicit requirements for plans to 
deal with emergencies in nuclear facilities. Yet, in 
accordance with the provisions of the Atomic Energy Act of 
1954, the requirements were not directed at the state and local 
governments. Rather, they applied to applicants for licenses 
to operate nuclear facilities. 
Veither the NRC nor the other Federal agencies presently 
have statutory authority to require state and local governments 
to establish emergency planning for coping with accidents 
arising from nuclear facilities. The NRCcan require only the 
licensee to develop such emergency response plans. The 
approval of a licensee's plan, however, is contingent upon the 
establishment of a working relationship between the licensee 
and the local authorities to provide early warning to the 
public and upon the implementation of appropriate protective 
measures in the event of a nuclear accident. 
The NRC recommended planning basis [14] suggests the 
establishment of "Emergency Planning Zones" (EPZs) about each 
nuclear facility. These zones are to be defined for both the 
short term "plume exposure pathwayn and for the longer term 
"ingestion exposure pathways." Within an EPZ, appropriate 
emergency responses are to be determined to assure that 
"effective actions can be taken to protect the public in the 
event of an accident" involving a nuclear facility located 
within the boundaries of the zone. Plans should take into 
account the nature of the population groups, the environmental 
conditions, the plant conditions, and the time available to 
respond. The NRC, however, places bounds on the measures which 
officials are expected to employ in carrying out this emergency 
planning. For example, Ivr.r Farticipation by the general public 
in test exercises of emery- .;y plans" is recommended [14]. 
Under 16 CFR Part 18E (Siting Criteria) an applicant for a 
nuclear power plant construction permit must use population 
distributions iG designate an exclusion area, a low population 
zone (LPZ) and a population center. The exclusion area must be 
of a size such that an individual at any point on its boundary 
would not receive a radiation dose of 25 REM to the whole body 
or 300 REV to the thyroid for two hours immediately following a 
"design basis" accident involving fission product release. The 
LPZ must be of such a size that an individual located at any 
point on its boundary would not receive a radiation dose of 25 
REM to the whole body or 300 REV to the thyroid during a 3'6 day 
period of exposure to a radioactive cloud. Dose guidelines are 
not prescribed for the population center, although it is 
tacitly assumed that doses for this area would be lower than 
those for the LPZ. 
V. INFORMATION DURING CRISIS 
The most fundamental information problem was suffered by 
the control room operators who were trying to maintain control 
of the crippled reactor. Instruments which were not designed 
to provide accurate readings under crisis mode operation failed 
to give information in the formats and quantities needed to 
make sound decisions. This fundamental information problem was 
inherited by the management personnel and public officials 
trying to make decisions to safeguard the public. The problem 
was compounded further by difficulties with communications. 
Phone lines in and out of the plant and control room were 
clogged to the point that sometimes communications were 
effectively at a standstill. 
Confidence in the ability of the licensee to provide 
accurate information was eroded early in the crisis. In a 
report issued on the morning of the accident the company 
claimed: "There have been no recordings of any significant 
levels of radiation and none are expected outside the plant 
[191." Yet a Pennsylvania Department of Environmental 
Resources helicopter flying over the plant shortly after the 
statement was issued reported detecting a small release of 
radiation into the environment. By the afternoon of Plarch 28th, 
Lieutenant Governor William Scranton I11 suggested that he 
might not be getting accurate information from 'the plant 
officials. At a press conference he told a group of reporters: 
"This situation is more complex than the Company first led us 
to believe. ~etro~olitan- Edison has been giving you and us 
conflicting information [19]." 
With several company personnel acting simultaneously as 
spokesmen, it was almost impossible to coordinate information, 
even within the same organization. Nuances of differences 
between the various spokesmen gave the media opportunity to 
highlight discrepencies, thereby contributing to the atmosphere 
of confusion. For example, at times chere was disagreement 
among the various parties about whether a release of radiation 
was unexpected or was part of a planned operation to control 
the plant. Therefore, on Friddy, the 30th, it was decided that 
Yetropolitan Edison wruld cease issuing statements regarding 
the status of the plar,: and that the NRC personnel at the plant 
site, not those in Washington, would serve as the official 
source of technical information. Meanwhile, the Governor's 
3Efice would serve as the official source of information 
regarding the possibility of an evacuation [lo]. 
Vl. DECISIONS MADE IN RESPONSE TO THREE MILE ISLAND 
In the initial moments of the accident sequence, the 
operators responded to what they believed to be a normal 
feedwater transient. Yet after nearly three hours of 
unsuccessful attempts to regain control of the plant, there was 
an indication of a potential for an off-site release of 
radiation. Therefore, the supervisor was required to notify 
off-site authorities. 
At approximately 7:02 a.m. on the morning of the 28th of 
Yarch, the Watch Officer of the Pennsylvania Emergency 
Yanaqement Agency received the first call from the Three Mile 
Island Plant Supervisor indicating that there was a site 
emergency, a condition which might lead to an on-site 
evacuation. By 7:35 a.m. PEMA had received notice of a general 
emergency, one which might involve the general public. The 
State's first response was to notify its Department of 
Environmental Resources, Bureau of Radiation Protection (BRP). 
Then all of the counties within a five mile radius of the plant 
were informed of the situation. By 7:45 a.m. GovernorThornburg 
had been notified of the crisis [1j!3]. 
Readings taken by the BRP on Wednesday the 28th and 
Thursday the 29th indicated no need for any protective action 
to be taken by the public. During this time conflicting 
reports on the condition at Three Mile Island were being issued 
so the State did little more than ensure that its 5 mile 
evacuation plan was up to date and maintain a ready posture to 
implement any necessary protective action. Three crisis 
headquarters were established to coordinate information and to 
serve as clearinghouses for statements regarding the situation 
at the plant. The On-Site Crisis Headquarters at Three Mile 
Island was the headquarters for the NRC and for all technical 
activities which were taking place. The Governor's Office was 
the central headquarters for the State and the coordinating 
headquarters for state activities. Everything which had to do 
with health problems or evacuation decisions came out of the 
Governor's Office and was coordinated through the third center, 
the Evacuation Headquarters. In addition, a Rumor Center was 
set up in Harrisburg and in three of the six counties involved 
in the crisis operation. Each of these rumor centers 
established toll-free telephone lines so the public could call 
in for information about the crisis situation and possible 
evacuation announcements [ l o ?  . 
On Thursday the 29Yh a large non-condensing void was 
identified in the reactor vzssel that threatened to uncover the 
reactor core, The void was determined to be composed of 
hydrogen which had been liberated in the reaction between the 
fuel cladding and hot steam. Plant operators wanted to compress 
the void but NRC officials advised against this action for fear 
that the void contained an explosive mixture. It was later 
determined that the mixture could not contain any free oxygen 
and hence posed no threat of explosion. Thus the operators 
were free to shrink the void. 
The role the NRC assumed during efforts to deal with the 
hydrogen bubble is illustrative of the stance maintained 
throughout the crisis. Although the Commission has the 
authority to order the utility if the public safety is at 
stake, officials insist that they never actually took command 
at Three Mile Island. However, NRC officials maintained very 
close contact with plant personnel and offered advice freely 
whenever operators were "looking for good ideas." In effect, 
the NRC was in control of the activities at the site, although 
they never took complete command. 
At 8 : 4 8  a.m. on the morning of Friday, March 30th, another 
general emergency message was received from Three Mile Island 
due to high radiation readings at a height of 600 feet above 
the stack. The Pennsylvania EOC was immediately activated and 
representatives were on hand in less than 30 minutes. At about 
9:15 a.m., senior personnel at NRC headquarters in Bethesda, 
Maryland, issued a recommendation that people should be 
evacuated to a distance of 10 miles from the plant site [la]. 
Prior to this time no mention had been made of the need to plan 
evacuations to a distance of 10 miles. Needless to say, 
planning problems were compounded by the increased scope of the 
proposed evacuation. Within a radius of 5 miles of the plant 
there were 3 counties containing approximately 25,000 people 
but no hospitals or nursing homes. Within a radius of 10 
miles, however, there were 4 counties with approximately 
136,000 people, 3 hospitals, and many nursing homes [la]. 
By the time the evacuation recommendation had been 
received from the NRC, the BRP had determined that the 
emmissions had been halted, so they recommended against an 
evacuation. Therefore, the Governor did not recommend an 
evacuation but suggested that all people within a 1g mile 
radius of the plant should remain indoors until further notice. 
Then about noon of the 3%th, the Governor recommended that 
pregnant women and preschool children be evacuated to 5 miles 
and that all schools within that radius be closed. 
In the afternoon of Friday, the 30th, Harold Denton 
arrived at TYI, and later that evening recommended considering 
evacuation plans for a distance of 20 miles from the plant 
r10i. This greatly increas:t3 the resources needed by the civil 
defense authorities. For an evacuation to 5 or 10 miles, the 
counties involved could have taken care of their own people. 
But plans for the 20 rile evacuation would involve 30 counties, 
approximately 650,090 people, and 9 hospitals. Additional hosts 
would be needed in adjacent counties and the EOC would have to 
be involved in the planning processes. Furthermore, the time 
required to effect the evacuations would be much longer. It 
was estimated that 3 hours would be required for the 5 mile 
evacuation plan, 7 hours for the 10 mile evacuation, and 10 
hours for the 20 mile evacuation [lfl]. All of these times, 
however, depended upon the fulfillment of several unmet needs. 
By Saturday, the 31st, all of PEMA's needs had been identified 
and requests for aid were submitted to the federal government. 
President Carter agreed to provide federal aid even though a 
state of emergency had not been declared. 
The next few days were spent refining preparations and 
writing out plans for an evacua.tion which never occurred. 
N e v e r t h e l e s s ,  many o f  t h e  r e s i d e n t s  l e f t  o f  t h e i r  own v o l i t i o n .  
The " s e l e c t i v e  e v a c u a t i o n "  o f  t h e  5 m i l e  r a d i u s  i n v o l v e d  o n l y  
p r e g n a n t  women and p r e - s c h o o l  a g e  c h i l d r e n ,  y e t  i t  i s  e s t i m a t e d  
t h a t  up t o  5B p e r  c e n t  o f  t h e  g e n e r a l  p o p u l a t i o n  e v a c u a t e d  o f  
t h e i r  own a c c o r d  and a p p r o x i m a t e l y  o n e - t h i r d  o f  t h o s e  i n  t h e  20 
mile r a d i u s  a l s o  l e f t  v o l u n t a r i l y  [101.  
V I I .  CONCLUSIONS 
A .  Human E r r o r  
Human e r r o r  is v i r t u a l l y  i m p o s s i b l e  t o  q u a n t i f y  and  
e q u a l l y  d i f f i c u l t  t o  e l i m i n a t e .  Y e t  many o f  t h e  "human" e r r o r s  
m u s t  be c o n s i d e r e d  i n  t h e  c o n t e x t  o f  s e v e r a l  r e l a t e d  f a c t o r s .  
The a u x i l i a r y  v a l v e s  were c l o s e d  d u e  t o  a  human e r r o r .  But  t h e  
c l o s e d  v a l v e s  may h a v e  g o n e  u n n o t i c e d  f o r  d a y s  o f  normal  
o p e r a t i o n  b e c a u s e  t h e r e  was no c h e c k l i s t  p r o c e d u r e  t o  
d o u b l e c h e c k  t h i s  s y s t e m .  T h e r e f o r e ,  a  p r o c e d u r a l  s h o r t c o m i n g  
mus t  a l s o  b e  i d e n t i f i e d .  The f a c t  t h a t  t h e  s i t u a t i o n  was n o t  
r e a d i l y  a p p a r e n t  i n  t h e  c o n t r o l  room s u g g e s t s  t h a t  b a s i c  
c o n t r o l  room d e s i g n  was a l s o  a  c o n t r i b u t i n g  f a c t o r .  T h e r e f o r e ,  
human f a c t o r s  a s p e c t s  o f  c o n t r o l  room d e s i g n  and o t h e r  man- 
mach ine  i n t e r f a c e  p r o b l e m s  a l s o  p l a y e d  a  r o l e  i n  t h i s  "human" 
e r r o r .  
S i m i l a r  c o m p l i - a t i n g  f a c t o r s  were i n v o l v e d  i n  t h e  
o p e r a t o r ' s  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  o f  t h e  h i g h  p r e s s u r i z e r  l e v e l  t o  mean 
t h a t  t h e  c o r e  was f l o o d e d .  The d e s i g n  o f  Babcock and  Wi lcox  
p r e s s u r i z e r s ,  i n  c o n j u n c t i o n  w i t h  t r a i n i n g  and e x p e r i e n c e  
r e g a r d i n g  t h e  r e t e n t i o n  o f  a  s t e a m  v a p o r  s p a c e  i n  t h e  
p r e s s u r i z e r ,  l e d  tile o p e r a t o r s  t o  p r e m a t u r e l y  t e r m i n a t e  HPI 
f l o w .  Thus  d e s i g n  f e a t u r e s  and o p e r a t o r  t r a i n i n g  c o n t r i b u t e d  
t o  t h i s  "human" e r r o r .  
F i n a l l y ,  t e s t i m o n y  i n d i c a t e s  t h a t  t h e  o p e r a t o r s  may h a v e  
b een  r e q u i r e d  by t h e i r  s t = n d a r d  p r o c e d u r e s  t o  t u r n  o f f  t h e  main  
c o o l a n t  pumps t o  a v o i d  d a n a q l n g  them [ 1 2 ] .  Though t h i s  may a t  
f i r s t  seem t o  be "human e i - r o r , "  i t  m i g h t  i n  r e t r o s p e c t  be  mos t  
c o r r e c t l y  t e rme d  " p r o c e d u r ~ l  e r r o r . "  
B .  M ec ha n i c a l  F a i l u r e  
P e r h a p s  t h e  mos t  s i g n i f i c a n t  l e s s o n  l e a r n e d  f rom t h e  
m e c h a n i c a l  f a i l u r e s  a t  TMI I1 is  t h a t  a  s e r i o u s  a c c i d e n t  c a n  
r e s u l t  f rom r e l a t i v e l y  minor  m e c h a n i c a l  m i s h a p s .  P r e v i o u s  
a n a l y t i c a l  a t t e n t i o n  h a s  f o c u s e d  on  t h e  l a r g e s t ,  mos t  
c a t a s t r o p h i c ,  b u t  l e a s t  p r o b a b l e  a c c i d e n t  s c e n a r i o s .  Thus  t h e  
TMI 11 a c c i d e n t ,  wh i c h  began  w i t h  a  r e l a t i v e l y  mino r  m e c h a n i c a l  
f a i l u r e ,  h a s  rhown t h a t  more a t t e n t i o n  n e e d s  t o  be  g i v e n  t o  
s m a l l - b r e a k  L O C A s .  
Y e c h a n i c a l  f a i l u r e ,  l i k e  human e r r o r ,  c a n  n e v e r  b e  
c o m p l e t e l y  e l i m i n a t e d ,  b u t  i t  t o o  c a n  b e  min imized  t h r o u g h  
careful reviews of chronic failure patterns. In testimony 
before the Senate on April 30, 1979, Harold Denton noted that 
Babcock & Wilcox reactors had experienced problems with faulty 
relief valves about 150 times before the incident at TMI 11. A 
faulty relief valve had also been noted at in the licensee 
event report for an incident at the Davis-Besse plant in 1977 
when 11,008 gallons of radioactive water escaped through a 
faulty relief valve into the reactor containment building. Yet 
this same mechanical component survived to plague operators at 
TMI 11. 
C. Design Errors 
General attention needs to be given to reactor designs 
which can be placed in a relatively passive mode even though 
instruments and major mechanical components have been severely 
degraded by an accident and subsequent events. The attempt to 
place the TMI I1 plant in the natural circulation state clearly 
illustrates the need for such designs. Furthermore, operators 
should be able to achieve this state with minimal 
instrumentation. 
Plant design should also allow operators to assess 
equipment status and environmental conditions in areas where 
high radiation levels prohibit entry by plant personnel. 
Primary needs include the ability to extract samples of 
pressurized coolant in order to determine levels of dissolved 
gases, the measurement of radiation levels in areas where 
primary coolant may leak, and the measurement of water levels 
in containment. 
D. Mitigation and Management 
Confusion in the early hours of the crisis clearly 
illustrated the nsed to establish a very limited number of 
credible sources of informat'jn. The decision to channel all 
technical information through tke NRC personnel at the site and 
the decision to coordinate all evacuation information through 
the Governor's Office eventually accomplished this goal, but 
only after over 43 hours oL sparse and often inaccurate 
information. 
Another lesson learned is that the decision center should 
3e moved to the site as soon as possible. A case in point was 
the recommendation from NRC headquarters to evacuate when 
information at the site indicated that there was no need for 
such an action. Harold Denton himself later said, "I guess 
I've learned that emergencies can only be managed by people on 
the site. They can't be managed back in Washington [9]." 
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